INTRODUCTION
Historical aspects of the Massachusetts State Building Code make the Boston Area particularly appropriate for this discussion of strength versus ductility. Since the 1970's, engineers, seismologists and public officials have worked to prepare Boston and other cities in Massachusetts for a destructive seismic event similar to the 1755 Cape Ann Earthquake. The success of these previous efforts, drawing heavily from the Seismic Design Decision Analysis project at MIT, is evidenced both in the creation and adoption of the "first seismic criteria developed specifically for a jurisdiction in the eastern Unites States" [Luft and Simpson, 1979] and in the Hazus Pilot Study conducted for Boston in the late 1990's [EQE, 1997] . Luft and Simpson summarized the philosophical conclusions of this work as follows.
The primary finding of these studies was that the probable maximum earthquake intensities for Massachusetts are as large as those for Zone 3 regions in California, but have much longer return periods. Because of the long return periods for destructive earthquakes, it was found that the cost to society of the earthquake-resistant design is considerably greater than the projected savings in damage and loss of life due to an earthquake. Nevertheless, the committee felt that society would insist on reasonable measures to mitigate the number of casualties from a major seismic event. It was therefore considered necessary to develop a set of criteria which would minimize the projected loss of life resulting from such an event, without causing construction costs to increase by an unacceptable amount. [Luft and Simpson, 1979, p. 1] These conclusions distinguished seismic design philosophy for Massachusetts from the contemporary SEAOC provisions for California by placing exclusive emphasis on protection against loss of life in an extreme event, and ignoring the need to minimize the cost of damage in minor and moderate earthquakes [SEAOC, 1974] .
Nearly 30 years later, the seismic design philosophy described by Luft and Simpson remains valid for moderate seismic regions, where most building owners and occupants are unlikely to experience a major seismic event during their lifetime. In the meantime, however, this philosophy has received an interesting historical twist that deserves new attention. In the 1970's it was clear to the Massachusetts seismic committee that the least costly way to protect new building stock was to require design and detailing at an acceptable level of ductility. In light of seismic provisions issued since the 1990's to protect chevron braced frames in high seismic regions, however, it has become clear that the alternative "elastic" design for R = 3 in SDC A, B and C results in steel structures that are significantly less expensive than its OCBF counterpart in the AISC Seismic Provisions [Hines, Gryniuk and Appel, 2007] .
If lateral systems may be designed more economically by other means than ductile components embedded in a capacity protected system, then it may be possible to develop an alternative seismic design philosophy for moderate seismic regions (Categories A, B and C) where collapse prevention is achieved through reserve capacity as opposed to ductility. In this paper, reserve capacity is defined as the system capacity after experiencing partial or total failure of the wind force resisting system. Ductility is defined as ductility in the wind force resisting system. This paper presents a simple study of a 9-story R = 3 chevron braced frame, where the brace connection fracture capacities were varied from the equivalents of R = 2 through R = 7 according to ASCE 7-02. The basis for this study including building geometry, modeling assumptions, ground motions and connection details is provided in [Hines, Gryniuk and Appel, 2007] . The discussion in this paper refers generally to this longer and more complete reference. Figure 1 shows story shear demand curves for ASCE 7-02, ASCE 7-05, and the 6 th Edition of the Massachusetts State Building Code. For reference, this figure includes wind story shears according to ASCE 7-05. Two key observations may be made from this figure. First, shear demand values vary dramatically between codes. Second, R = 3 shear demands are significantly higher than wind demands, which correspond approximately to a level between R = 6 and R = 7. Table 1 displays numerically the differences in code prescribed seismic demands. The value of R = 3 as a lower bound to represent systems with no explicit provisions for ductility implies that even lower values of R might be used with increasing safety until an elastic R value is reached. Note that this elastic value of R cannot be easily prescribed since it should be based on some higher percentile ground motion than the code prescribed design ground motion.
VARIATIONS IN COLLAPSE BEHAVIOR ACCORDING TO CONNECTION STRENGTH
As a test this implicit hypothesis that less ductility requires more strength, this simple study on connection fracture strength yielded some surprising, yet ultimately intuitive, results. Figure  2 shows the inelastic drift behavior of R = 3 and R = 5 connection fracture strength models under the same ground motion (GM3). Note that while the R = 3 frame began to collapse between 8 and 9 seconds, the R = 5 frame remained stable for the duration of the motion. This difference in behavior may be explained by the diagrams in Figure 2 depicting brace fracture. Note that the R = 3 frame experienced damage only in its upper floors, whereas the R = 5 frame experienced uniform damage throughout the structure. It follows that these two frames proceeded past the 8.5 second mark with two different damaged periods, that of the R = 5 frame being significantly larger than the R = 3 frame (see Table 3 ), and therefore attracting less force to the damaged structure. Table 2 summarizes the non-linear behavior and collapses for all 6 frames under the 14 ground motions. The non-linear behavior is marked with an "X" and a collapse is noted by a circle indicating the story collapsed. The building was initially designed as an R = 3 frame. Only the brace strength was considered when varying the R value of the model; therefore, no collapses were attributed to column overloads. When scaling the brace forces, gravity loads were not considered. None of the frames were detailed for seismic resistance. Table 2 shows that the R = 3 frame experienced more collapse situations than any of the other frames. Furthermore, while the R = 2 frame experienced one less collapse than the R = 3 frame, it generally fared equally or worse than the frames with higher R values. While ground motions 3 and 4 were generally assumed to represent upper bounds on ARS magnitude, GM 13 was the only motion to collapse all of the frames studied. Further investigation of the frames' behavior under GM 13 raised an interesting counterpoint to the apparently improved behavior at lower fracture strengths. Table 3 shows the first three periods of three different states of damage of the building. The local damage represents brace fracture in the upper stories only seen in the R = 3 frame and the completely damaged structure represents the uniform failure of the R = 5 frame depicted in Figure 2 . Figure 3 shows the ARS curves for all 14 motions with the curve for GM 13 highlighted. The enlarged inset in this figure shows that GM 13 produced by far the highest spectral accelerations at T = 8 seconds, which is approximately the first natural period of the damaged structure as shown for R = 5 in Figure 2 . Table 4 shows that the shear demand based on modal analysis of the first three modes of the fully damaged structure was 193 kips for GM 13. This was more than twice the demand of every other ground motion with the exception of GM 8, which produced a demand on the first story of the damaged structure of 101 kips. Figure 3 also shows GM 6 amplified by a factor of 4 as part of an incremental dynamic analysis to determine collapse capacity. This amplified ARS curve value for GM 6 matched GM 13 curve relatively closely at 8 seconds. Note that none of the ground motions produced ARS values higher than the site class D ASCE 7-05 values shown for reference. 
SIMPLIFIED ASSESSMENT OF COLLAPSE BEHAVIOR
The fact that the GM 13 collapses might be explained by elastic modal analysis of the damaged structures suggests that simple demand/capacity assessments of the damage structures under a certain level of drift may be sufficient to predict collapse with reasonable accuracy. The important parameters are story shear capacity, identification of story that will collapse, and drift coincident with ARS demand. While the damage patterns shown in Figure 2 represent typical behavior observed in several frames, actual damage patterns varied over a wide range depending on ground motion and building configuration. It is therefore unclear to the authors whether the locations and extents of brace damage might be identified without the aid of non-linear time history analysis. Assuming, however, that the locations and extents of damage are known, reserve capacity of the damaged systems can be calculated according to the free body diagrams shown in Figure 4 . These calculations highlight the diminished capacity of both the gravity frame and a damaged brace on the first story. The increased story height and lack of fixity at the base of the first story caused a dramatic decrease in the reserve capacity. Table 5 shows the damaged lateral capacity of the first story to be 247 kips, which exceeds the 193 kip elastic demand on the damaged structure from Table 4 . Considering second order effects, however, it quickly becomes clear that 247 kips is not enough reserve capacity to resist the damaged elastic demand. Table 5 also shows reserve capacity for each story assuming that story reached a drift level of 1%. While this level of drift had only a small effect on the building's upper floors, it reduced the capacity of the first story by nearly 40%, more than enough to collapse the structure.
Total= (2) Comparing the capacity values in Table 5 to the ground motion demands in Table 4 , GM 13 was the only motion to exceed the first story capacity at 1 percent drift. At 1 percent drift almost half of the reduced capacity was used in resisting drift, further diminishing the frame's lateral capacity. Using the same free body diagrams in Figure 4 , the maximum first story drift was calculated to be approximately 2.6 percent. Figure 5 shows the first story drift of the R = 5 frame under GM13. The frame was able to reach approximately 2% drift before it is no longer stable. 
CONCLUSIONS
This study highlighted some interesting aspects of chevron braced frame collapse behavior based on variations in connection fracture strength. Chief among these was the fact that increased strength did not guarantee significantly improved collapse performance. In several cases, lower connection strengths allowed damage to distribute almost uniformly through the system, effectively decreasing stiffness in such a way as to significantly reduce demands. Systems with stronger connections tended to experience damage concentrated on only a couple of stories, while maintaining substantial stiffness in the overall system. Often, these partially damaged systems maintained enough stiffness to continue attracting significant forces, which in turn overwhelmed the damaged stories. While the effects of uniform damage appeared to benefit the structures' collapse behavior, such uniform damage also made the first story particularly vulnerable to collapse. In fact, when subjected to ground motions that were scaled to produce system collapses, the R = 5 frame collapsed at the first story under every motion. Conversely, under certain ground motions the R = 3 structure protected the first story by concentrating damage in higher floors. From a reliability-based performance assessment point of view (SAC, 2000), the R = 5 structure actually offered lower confidence than the R = 3 structure because its drift capacities were limited by the first story. Under certain motions, the R = 3 structure could experience much higher collapse drifts simply because they occurred at higher stories.
This observed behavior could be replicated and clearly understood based on elastic modal analysis techniques of the damaged structures. Such insights can help provide the workings for a coherent seismic design philosophy for low-ductility systems in moderate seismic regions. Regardless of connection strength, it seems possible to design an appropriate reserve system to prevent collapse under earthquake loads, while designing bracing members and connections for wind loads only. Such a system would require more thought than an R = 3 system, but has the potential to be both less expensive and safer for buildings where wind forces exceed earthquake forces. This reserve system would have to be tuned to the type of damage expected in the wind bracing system. Currently, it is not clear that damage patterns can be predicted by means other than non-linear time history analysis. Until simple methods are developed to provide insight into the extent and location of damage, however, non-linear time history analysis tools can aid in designing appropriate reserve systems. If such systems can be demonstrated to provide at least 90% confidence for collapse prevention according to a reliability-based performance assessment, they may provide a safer and more economical approach to seismic design in moderate seismic regions than by simply assuming R = 3.
